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The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act-
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1955, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) began working on a model act for states to follow in order
to promote arbitration as both a viable and desirable alternative to litigation.
The result of NCCUSL's efforts, the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956
(UAA), was tremendously successful as it garnered full passage in thirty-four
states and the District of Columbia and provided the model for arbitration
acts in fourteen other states.1 While the UAA did address issues such as
enforcement of arbitration agreements, appointment of arbitrators, and
review of arbitration awards, its coverage was general in nature. With the
increase in use and complexity of arbitration processes, the UAA became
viewed as an antiquated legal tool. 2 Simply stated, the UAA failed to answer
numerous questions that had become commonplace in contemporary
arbitration. 3
Therefore, in 1995, NCCUSL began studying the feasibility of revising
the UAA. By May 1997, it had commenced the first of eight committee
meetings of legal practitioners, legal academics, and representatives from
industries affected by arbitration, who together intended to draft a more
comprehensive uniform act.4 Three years of work by the drafters resulted in
*The full text of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act is available
at:http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/arbitratl 213.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2002).
I Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Is It the Wrong Cure?,
Disp. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2002, at 10; Joseph Colagiovanni & Thomas Hartmann,
Enforcing Arbitration Awards n. 1, 'Lectric Law Library, at
http://www.lectlaw.com/files/adr I5.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2002).
2 See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act Receiving Widespread Support, Endorsed by American Bar
Association, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pressreleases/pr2-22-0 1-I .asp (Feb. 22,
2001).
3 Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in
Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REv. 175, 209-10 (2002) (raising a litany of specific
issues that were not addressed by the original UAA, such as whether overlapping
arbitration proceedings can or must be consolidated, whether arbitrators can be required
to testify in other proceedings, and whether parties can contract for expanded court
review for errors of law by arbitrators).
4 Cole, supra note 1, at 10-11.
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the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA), which was officially
approved by NCCUSL in August 2000.5
Shortly thereafter, the American Arbitration Association, the National
Arbitration Forum, seven separate sections of the American Bar Association,
and a number of other organizations publicly endorsed the RUAA. 6 More
importantly, multiple state legislatures began to explore and debate passage
of the RUAA as law to replace statutory language either taken from or
inspired by the UAA. In April 2001, the drafters' labor was rewarded when
New Mexico became the first state to officially adopt the language of the
RUAA as law. 7
II. THE INTENTIONS OF THE RUAA
According to the RUAA Drafting Committee, three main goals existed in
the promulgation of this uniform act. First, the committee wanted to
encourage party autonomy by making most of the act a default mechanism
only applicable in areas where the parties' own agreement was silent or
violated notions of fundamental fairness. Second, the committee wanted to
provide a model for arbitration that was increasingly efficient, streamlined,
and thus, more attractive to parties. Finally, the committee wanted to
recognize the contractual nature of arbitration by limiting the grounds on
which a court may review an arbitrator's award. 8
Specifically, the committee sought to modernize this act by adding
provisions addressing, among other topics, electronic communication,
consolidation of arbitration proceedings, disclosure of conflicts of interest by
arbitrators, non-monetary remedies, vacatur of arbitration awards, attorney's
5 See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Arbitration Act Revised, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pressreleases/pr8-3-00-6.asp
(Aug. 3, 2000).
6 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, supra note 2.
According to the press release, other organizations that publicly supported the RUAA
were the National Academy of Arbitrators, JAMS/Endispute, the Dispute Resolution
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and the American
College of Real Estate Lawyers.
7 Justin Kelly, New Mexico First to Adopt Revised Uniform Arbitration Act,
ADRWorld.com, at http://www.adrworld.com (Apr. 6, 2001).
8 Timothy J. Heinsz, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Modernizing, Revising,
and Clarifying Arbitration Law, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 3. Professor Heinsz was
Reporter to the Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform Arbitration Act.
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fees, punitive damages, discovery, jurisdiction, arbitral immunity, and the
use of arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts.9
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE RUAA
Being a relatively recent creation, the RUAA is currently the subject of
significant debate among legal practitioners and academicians. Those who
appreciate the RUAA as drafted argue that it effectively brings the original
UAA into the arena of contemporary arbitration and that it offers arbitrating
parties greater options and protections than previously afforded. 10 Critics of
the uniform act suggest that while its intentions are noble and a number of its
provisions a step forward, the RUAA, most notably, does not go far enough
to specifically address the interests of both repeat and one-time arbitrating
parties, I I is too weak in its handling of arbitration agreements in adhesion
contracts, and is continuously at the mercy of federal preemption.12
A. Arguments Supportive of the RUAA
Multiple observers have, at the least, agreed that the RUAA is a positive
initiative in that it provides much more specific and detailed direction than
the original UAA in handling arbitration questions and problems arising at
9 Id. at 9-53; Cole, supra note 1, at 11. The specific sections of the RUAA that deal
with the topics listed are the following: electronic communication (section 1, defining
"record" as information that can be stored in an electronic medium); the use of arbitration
agreements in adhesion contracts (sections 4 and 6); non-monetary remedies (section 8 on
provisional remedies and section 21 on final remedies); consolidation of arbitration
proceedings (section 10); disclosure of conflicts of interest by arbitrators (section 12);
arbitral immunity (section 14); discovery (section 17); punitive damages (section 21);
vacatur of arbitration awards (section 23); attorney's fees (section 25); and jurisdiction
(section 26). See Heinsz, supra note 8, at 54-66.
10 See Heinsz, supra note 8, at 52; Justin Kelly, ABA House of Delegates Adopts
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, ADRWorld.com, at http://www.adrworld.com (Feb. 23,
2001) (quoting a key member of the American Bar Association's (ABA) House of
Delegates as stating that the ABA will use its "enormous moral authority" and
"imprimatur" to gain passage of the RUAA in as many states as possible).
I See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit,
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 759, 779-80 (2001).
12Heinsz, supra note 8, at 3--8; see generally Cole, supra note 1; Stephen L.
Hayford, Federal Preemption and Vacatur: The Bookend Issues under the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 67.
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the state level.13 Among the most praised sections of this uniform act seem to
be those allowing arbitrators to grant interim relief to parties and award
attorney's fees, as well as the provisions on arbitrator immunity, arbitrator
disclosure, discovery, and consolidation. 14
The reasoning behind support for these provisions lies with both the
apparent flexibility in which they allow arbitrators to develop appropriate
remedies for particular situations and the protection that they afford parties
from arbitral abuse. For instance, if circumstances surrounding an arbitration
seem particularly sensitive and confidentiality is deemed important to the
proceedings, the RUAA gives an arbitrator, like a judge, the express ability
to issue protective orders to ensure procedural fairness. 15 Likewise, this
revised uniform act, unlike its predecessor, gives arbitrators the freedom to
award fees for legal counsel and other reasonable expenses even if the parties
do not explicitly grant the arbitrator such ability. 16
Parties, in turn, are insulated from systemic abuse by the provisions on
arbitrator disclosure and consolidation. The disclosure section requires
arbitrators to reveal all potential conflicts of interest stemming from their
own personal affairs, whether in the present or past, in order to avoid judicial
challenges by disgruntled parties on grounds of evident partiality or
impropriety. 17
The consolidation provision, subject to waiver by the parties, allows
courts, not arbitrators, to join together separate arbitral proceedings relating
to similar transactions, common parties, or common issues of law or fact.18
13 See Samuel Estreicher & Kenneth J. Turnbull, Revised Uniform Arbitration Act
Approved, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 2000, at 3, 6 (noting that the RUAA is, on the whole, a
"worthy and overdue effort to modernize our arbitration laws"); Hayford, supra note 12,
at 87-88 (summarizing the issues addressed by the RUAA and predicting that the act
"will provide the states with a template for bringing the legal framework for arbitration
into the twenty-first century .... "); Cole, supra note 1, at 13 (opining that "the RUAA,
particularly in its outstanding commentary, updates and modernizes arbitration .... ").
14 See Kelly, supra note 10; Expected Impact of New Legislation on State
Arbitration Regimes - Holland & Knight LLP (Dec. 7, 2001), ALL REGIONS, available at
LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years; for corresponding RUAA sections to
these provisions, see supra text accompanying note 9.
15 Heinsz, supra note 8, at 21, 57; Expected Impact of New Legislation on State
Arbitration Regimes - Holland & Knight LLP, supra note 14.
16 Heinsz, supra note 8, at 23, 63.
171Id. at 17-20, 58-59; see James H. Carter, US Takes Steps to Promote Arbitrator
Ethics, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Mar. 1, 2002, available at WESTLAW, 2002 WL 1493825
(opining that the RUAA, by requiring arbitrators to disclose their affiliations and
interests, takes positive steps to further arbitrator neutrality).
18 Heinsz, supra note 8, at 11-16, 58.
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This new section of the RUAA is intended to encourage arbitral efficiency
and avoid inconsistent determinations. 19
B. Arguments Critical of the RUA,
For all of the benefits that this revised uniform act seems to present, there
is suspicion among many observers that the RUAA's provisions do not fully
address the needs and problems of contemporary arbitration. While some
legal scholars simply remind state legislatures that they should carefully
scrutinize each of the act's various parts before adopting it in full, 20 others
suggest that the drafters were too conservative in their approach and fell
short of creating a model statute appreciably better than the UAA. Among
such criticisms is that the RUAA is likely to be onerous to parties that
arbitrate often, be insufficient protection for those parties that arbitrate rarely,
and be ineffective both substantively and procedurally unless embraced
enough that it encourages reform at the federal level. 21
1. Distinction Between Repeat and One-Time Arbitrating Parties
At least one legal scholar has opined that in spite of its goals to be more
sensitive to arbitrating parties than its predecessor, the RUAA is deficient in
meeting such goals because it fails to address the needs of both repeat and
19See id. at 13-15.
2 0 Estreicher & Turnbull, supra note 13, at 5-6. The authors explain that certain
provisions of the RUAA, such as the provisions regarding arbitrator disclosure and
vacatur of awards, might be seen as undesirable by state legislatures. Specifically, they
note that section 12(e) of the RUAA states that when an arbitrator appointed as a neutral
actor fails to disclose a "known, direct, and material interest in the outcome of the
arbitration proceeding" or a "known, existing, and substantial relationship with a party,"
the arbitrator is presumed to act with evident partiality, and grounds exist for a court to
vacate an arbitrator's decision. Id. at 2-6; see Heinsz, supra note 8, at 59, 63. Estreicher
and Turnbull suggest that such a provision is dangerous because it opens the door too
wide for losing parties to appeal an arbitrator's decision in a court of law and, thus,
undermines the desired finality of awards. Likewise, the authors state that since section
4(c) prohibits parties from altering the delineated grounds for vacating arbitral awards,
the RUAA presents an "improper and unnecessary interference with the parties' right to
contract." Estreicher & Turnbull, supra note 13, at 5.
21 See Cole, supra note 11, at 777-80; Cole, supra note 1, at 12-13. But see
Hayford, supra note 12, at 84-88 (arguing that while federal preemption is a threat to
state regulation of arbitration processes, the RUAA was drafted carefully enough that, in
the greater number of circumstances, the act stands on its own as a progressive work out
of the reach of federal preemption).
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one-time players in arbitration.22 Namely, the act contains multiple
provisions that cannot be waived by either of the parties until a dispute
arises, 23 or that cannot be waived at all during the arbitral process. 24 To
repeat players, or those parties who arbitrate often, the argument is that these
fixed provisions, especially those concerning extensive discovery, should be
open to waiver so that familiar processes are not threatened by allowing
experienced parties the option to burden arbitral proceedings. 25
Conversely, to one-time players, or those parties that rarely arbitrate, the
argument is that while some of the fixed provisions make sense, such as
those ensuring the right of representation at an arbitral proceeding, they offer
too little protection from the primary concern of such parties, namely that the
pre-dispute arbitration agreements they sign do not provide them an adequate
forum in which to vindicate their statutory rights.26 The specific concern for
one-time players, such as individual consumers and employees, is that
notwithstanding the RUAA's protections, it is still possible in some states to
waive statutory rights to obtain punitive damages, participate in class actions,
and seek effective judicial review of arbitration decisions 7
22 See generally Cole, supra note 11, at 777-80.
23 Id. Among the provisions that cannot be waived by the parties until a dispute
arises are (1) the right to representation by an attorney at' an arbitral proceeding (section
4(b)(4)), (2) the right to move the arbitrator to award provisional remedies and interim
awards (section 8), and (3) the right to move the arbitrator to issue subpoenas for
witnesses and records or to order depositions (sections 17(a) and (b)). Id. at 778.
24 Id. Among the provisions that cannot be waived by the parties at any point of the
arbitral process, as described in section 4(c), are (1) the right to move the court to
confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitral award or to compel or stay arbitration, (2) the
power of the court to award reasonable costs for motions and subsequent judicial
proceedings, and (3) the arbitrator's immunity from testifying in subsequent judicial
proceedings. Id.
25 Id. at 778-79.
26 Cole, supra note 1, at 12.
27 Id. In the footnotes to her unpublished article, Professor Cole explains that legal
loopholes potentially exist in the RUAA in which unwitting parties can waive their
statutory rights to relief. For example, on the issue of effective judicial review of an
arbitration decision, a party is not protected from waiving its right to review of an award
for manifest disregard of the law despite section 4 of the RUAA, which prohibits parties
from waiving the statutory grounds for vacatur. Professor Cole adds that manifest
disregard of the law is often a reason that federal appellate courts are willing to review
cases challenging arbitral awards. Id. at n.13 (citing Stephen L. Hayford, A New
Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned
Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 443, 445-51
(1998)).
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2. Adhesion Contracts in Arbitration Agreements
Among the most articulated of the concerns practitioners and
academicians have expressed regarding the RUAA is that is does not do
enough to protect vulnerable parties, such as standard consumers, from
adhesion contracts and, specifically, those adhesion contracts that are
unconscionable. 28 Indeed, the drafters themselves held concerns of
unconscionability in adhesion contracts as they worked on formulating a
final version of the revised act. 29 Correspondence among the drafters reveals
that four options were under consideration for how the act should address
such issues, ranging from the drafting of specific language in each section of
the RUAA touching on adhesion situations, to a single discussion of how
various industry protocols react with due process concerns in the
employment relations context.30
In the end, the drafters decided on an option by which the inequities of
adhesion contracts were to be discussed in the auxiliary notes to the act, but
where state substantive law would be left free to react to claims of
28 See Cole, supra note 1, at 11; Heinsz, supra note 8, at 6-8; see Memorandum
from Dean Timothy Heinsz, Reporter to the Drafting Committee to Revise the Uniform
Arbitration Act, to the Drafting Committee 1, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uarba/he-kad- .htm (Mar. 19, 1998). Heinsz notes that,
among other factors, courts look at the following when considering unconscionability of
an arbitration agreement:
[U]nequal bargaining power, the conspicuousness of the arbitration clause, whether
the weaker party has the option to opt out of arbitration, clarity of the term, whether
an unfair advantage [is] obtained, whether the term is negotiable, whether the term is
boilerplate, whether the aggrieved party had a "meaningful" choice or was
compelled to accept, whether the arbitration agreement is within the reasonable
expectations of [the] weaker party, and whether the stronger party used any
deceptive tactics.
Id.
29 See Cole, supra note 1, at 11.
30 Id. The text of the four options noted by Professor Heinsz in his memorandum are
the following: (a) add specific language in each section of the RUAA that might touch on
adhesion situations, (b) have the RUAA cover only commercial agreements and propose
that NCCUSL have separate acts for situations likely to involve unequal bargaining
power, such as consumer, employment, franchises, etc., (c) discuss the special problems
of adhesion contracts in the arbitration setting in the Prefatory Note and/or Reporter
Comments but leave to developing state (and federal) substantive law the applicable
doctrines for contracts of adhesion and unconscionability, and (d) discuss the use of
industry protocols similar to the due process protocol for mediation and arbitration of
statutory disputes arising out of the employment relationship. Id. See also Heinsz, supra
note 8, at 6-8.
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unconscionability and to develop individual schemes to handle such claims. 31
Thus, given an opportunity to take a bolder stance denouncing boilerplate
arbitration agreements that force weaker parties to accept terms on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis, the drafters chose a road that clarified their views but did
not expressly advocate state prohibition of certain adhesion arrangements.
While supporters of the drafters' ultimate decision note that the multiple
non-waivable provisions of the RUAA encourage arbitration arrangements
that are not unconscionable, 32 critics of the drafters' action see their benign
stance as an opportunity lost in the battle for fundamental fairness in
arbitration. 33 Both sides, however, agree that the main problem underlying
the question of how to handle adhesion situations in the RUAA is the reality
of federal preemption.
3. Federal Preemption
As in other areas of law, arbitration at the state level is always subject to
supercession by federal law if the proceedings concern any aspect of a
transaction or arrangement affecting interstate commerce. Since 1925, the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has been the mechanism by which courts have
applied law to arbitration agreements falling within federal jurisdiction.34
Over those seventy-seven years, federal judges have, by and large, developed
a pro-arbitration stance when it comes to claims challenging the validity of
arbitration agreements,35 and have interpreted the FAA as being a tool
31 Cole, supra note 1, at 11; Heinsz, supra note 8, at 7.
32 Heinsz, supra note 8, at 8. Professor Heinsz emphasizes that section 4 of the
RUAA requires a party, before a dispute arises, to waive the right to representation by an
attorney at an arbitration proceeding. Such a provision, according to Professor Heinsz,
places specific limits on a party's ability to unreasonably restrict notice of the initiation of
an arbitration proceeding, to unreasonably prevent disclosure by a neutral arbitrator, to
limit an arbitrator's subpoena power, or to prevent applications to a court to aid the
arbitration process. Id. In short, such an argument supports the view that the drafters did
indeed take proactive measures to encourage fair and equitable arbitration arrangements.
33 Cole, supra note 1, at 11. Professor Cole states that "[u]ndoubtedly, many of the
drafters found [the RUAA's handling of adhesion situations] unsatisfactory because it
failed to address by statute concerns about adhesive arbitration agreements." Id. One of
the solutions offered by Professor Cole to strengthen the RUAA is for a reworked version
to explicitly recognize the importance of unconscionability and adhesion contract issues
in the arena of federal preemption so that pressure can be created to encourage change in
the "unworkable federal law of arbitration." Id.
34 See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 3, at 176.
35 1d. at 186-89. In their article, Professors Hayford and Palmiter chronicle the
development of the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence relating to the
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intended to enforce such agreements notwithstanding concerns of coercion
and unfairness. 36
In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized
the positive effects of state law on arbitration arrangements concerning
interstate commerce to the extent that such laws do not oppose the FAA's
pro-arbitration policies.37 Practically, this means that state law will be
preempted by operation of the FAA if such law "[singles] out arbitration
provisions for suspect status" 38 and does not address issues such as adhesion
contracts and unconscionability in a merely general fashion.39
interaction of state law and federal law in federal diversity cases. The authors note that
while the famous case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), curbed the
power of federal courts to create "federal common law" and assumedly left the states free
to develop means to handle issues such as arbitration, the Court, by the middle 1960s,
was much less willing to accept the power of state law and its normally "outcome-
determinative" approach. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 3, at 186-88. Specifically,
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), abandoned an outcome-determinative approach in
diversity cases, ruling that federal policy would trump state law even if the federal policy
determined the outcome. This rule directly addressed arbitration in Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conldin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), where the Court ruled that FAA
standards alone governed the validity of commercial arbitration clauses in federal
diversity cases. Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 3, at 188.
36M. at 180. The authors note that the FAA "grew out of a business-led reform
movement in the 1920s to overcome the longstanding judicial hostility to the enforcement
of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate," and that the act's "quick read" nature places an
unmistakable emphasis on judicial respect for commercial arbitration at the beginnings
and ends of the arbitral process. Id.
37 See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492
(1987) (noting the basic policy the Supreme Court has adopted is that courts, state or
federal, may not "in assessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement,
construe that agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes
nonarbitration agreements under state law").
3 8 Doctor'sAssocs., 517 U.S. at 687.
39 See Hayford, supra note 12, at 73-76. Professor Hayford explains that the issue of
federal preemption can be thought of in terms of a continuum ranging from "front end"
issues, which are most susceptible to preemption, to contract formation issues, which are
practically immune from the influence of federal law. These front-end issues are
concerned with "enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate, determinations of substantive
aribitrability, and any of the other questions raised when a party attempts to evade an
otherwise valid arbitration contract." Id. at 74. The other category of issues Hayford notes
as being particularly vulnerable to preemption includes so-called "back end" issues,
which include "vacatur, confirmation, and modification of arbitral awards." Id. In
essence, if a particular state law addresses unconscionability in terms of matters germane
to agreements to arbitrate or results of arbitration processes, Hayford suggests that the
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While some observers see federal preemption as unlikely to occur with
the RUAA unless adopting states are inspired to enact law making arbitration
processes difficult,40 others recognize the RUAA as a work that, in being
carefully crafted so as not to speak too loudly against the FAA and risk
possible preemption, sacrifices its own goals out of fear.4' The key question
underlying such an analysis asks how often federal courts will find the
revised act's provisions inconsistent with the FAA. While time will tell if the
RUAA is ultimately harmed by the prospect of federal preemption, the
debate continues as to how states should adopt the RUAA to handle this
troublesome issue.42
IV. STATE ADOPTION OF THE RUAA
Since receiving final approval from NCCUSL in August 2000, the
RUAA has to date been successfully passed into law in four states: New
Mexico (April 2001), 43 Nevada (May 2001), 44 Hawaii (June 2001), 4 5 and
danger of preemption is high and application of the arguably anachronistic FAA likely.
See id. at 75, 80.
40 Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-In" for Judicial Review of Errors of Law under the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 263, 269 (1997). Professor
Ware notes that to predict if a state law, or the RUAA for that matter, is preempted by the
FAA, one should simply "ask whether the state law prevents enforcement of any possible
arbitration agreement." Id. Under this analysis, if a state law does not, on its own, render
an arbitration agreement unenforceable, then preemption is not a threat to that state law.
Id.
41 Cole, supra note 1, at 12-13 (opining that the RUAA could have been much more
effective in protecting employees and consumers in arbitration agreements and
encouraging reform at the federal level if preemption had not been a major overriding
concern of the drafters); Heinsz, supra note 8, at 5 (recognizing that the "strong policy of
federal preemption under the FAA acted as backdrop to all the discussions of the Drafting
Committee while it deliberated the RUAA"); see Justin Kelly, RUAA Seen as Model for
Amendments to Federal Arbitration Act, ADRWorld.com, at http://www.adrworld.com
(July 27, 2000).
42 See Cole, supra note 1, at 12. Professor Cole has suggested that the RUAA cover
only commercial agreements and that NCCUSL "[develop] separate acts for [matters]
involving unequal bargaining." Id. (alterations added). The rationale behind such a
suggestion is that states should have a model for developing statutes such as the "North
Carolina Fair Bargain Act," which avoids preemption by applying to all adhesion
contracts and rendering voidable, by employees and consumers, any rights enforcement
disabling clause appearing in a standard form contract or lease. Id. at n. 16.
43 Kelly, supra note 7; see Text of New Mexico H.B. 768, available at
http://www.legis.state.nm.us/Session0l.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
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Utah (March 2002).46 States such as Alabama 47 and New Jersey 48 have been
actively debating 'the merit's of the uniform act within their legislative
chambers, while a host of other states, have witnessed the act, at the very
least, introduced in bill f6rm. 49
The most notable aspect of how states have embraced the RUAA is that,
for the most part, state legislatures, in both their proposed and eventually
enacted laws, have deviated from the exact version of the act as promulgated.
New Mexico, the first state to pass law directly inspired by the RUAA,
placed an amendment in its legislative code barring arbitration provisions
that deny procedural rights.50 Nevada, the second state to adopt the revised
act, did so with a provision eliminating an arbitrator's power to award
punitive damages, a condition that did not appear in NCCUSL's version of
the act. 51
Additionally, Alabama is currently considering passage of the act with a
provision mandating that arbitration agreements not be enforced if such an
arrangement is not "entered into freely and knowingly by the parties to the
contract. ' 52 New Jersey lawmakers have proposed a RUAA requiring higher
44 Justin Kelly, Nevada Second State to Adopt Revised Uniform Arbitration Act,
ADRWorld.com, at http://www.adrworld.com (June 8, 2001); see Text of Nevada S.B.
336, available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/71st/Reports/history.cfin?ID=4105 (last
visited Oct. 4, 2002).
45 Justin Kelly, Hawaii First to Adopt Revised Arbitration Act Unchanged,
ADRWorld.com, at http://www.adrworld.com (July 3, 2001); see Text of Hawaii S.B.
1571, available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2001/bills/SB1571_.htm (last
visited Oct. 4, 2002).
46 See Text of Utah S.B. 171, available at
http://www.le.state.ut.us/-2002/bills/sbillamd/sbOl 71 .htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
47 See Justin Kelly, Alabama Weighs Significantly Modified Revised Arbitration Act,
ADRWorld.com, at http://www.adrworld.com (Jan. 14, 2002).
48 See ADRWorld.com, New Jersey Lawmakers Approve Modified Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act, at http://www.adrworld.com (May 13, 2002).
49 Among those states/districts are Arizona, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, and West Virginia. See A Few
Facts About the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), at
http://nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp (last visited Oct. 4,
2002). Bills were submitted in Connecticut and Vermont, but died while in committee.
Securities Arbitration Commentator, New Jersey to Adopt Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act, at http://www.seclaw.com/docs/sac/njad6psruaaO5O2.htm (May 2002).
50 Kelly, supra note 7.
51 Cole, supra note 1, at 12-13; Kelly, supra note 44.
52 Kelly, supra note 47.
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levels of disclosure from arbitrators regarding conflicts of interest than
required under the model act. 53
Ultimately, the RUAA is being used precisely in the way it was intended,
as a model for state arbitration law. Much like legal practitioners and
academicians, legislators, assuming they can garner consensus, are able to
accept or reject provisions of the act according to their personal and political
inclinations. The danger in deviating from the model RUAA, of course, is
that state law, in attempting to promote equity and fairness in arbitration
arrangements, may invade the province of the FAA and find itself nullified
by federal preemption. It remains to be seen whether a lack of complete
uniformity in its adoption by the states proves to be a liability for the RUAA
in terms of its effectiveness in reforming arbitration on a broad scale.
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether an observer is supportive or critical of the
RUAA as enacted by NCCUSL some two years ago, there can be little doubt
that this revision of a tremendously successful uniform act has spurred
spirited and necessary debate among those interested in and affected by
arbitration processes. In a legal world that is continuously evolving, it is
necessary that new ideas, at the very least, be seen as fuel for discussion and
careful analysis upon existing legal systems. Aside from being the
mechanism by which to regulate state arbitration law for the twenty-first
century or, perhaps, the tool with which to challenge an old and established
federal arbitration scheme, the RUAA has provided the forum by which
contemporary arbitration can be explored and, ideally, improved for the
benefit of both seasoned and unseasoned players in arbitration.
Matthew E. Braun
53 ADRWorld.com, supra note 48.
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